In addition to utilitarianism and Kantianism, natural law has in common with virtue ethics that it is a living option for an ethical theory of the first principles of analytic philosophy. Like any knowledge of the practical intellect, natural commandments do not exist before the movement of reason. The object of practical thought is not there as a reality presented to the intelligence. In contrast to the multitude of Hobbes` laws, Cumberland states in the very first sentence of his treatise on the laws of nature that “all the laws of nature are reduced to one, benevolence towards all rationals.” [108] He later clarified, “By the name of rational, I ask permission to understand God and man; and I do so under the authority of Cicero. Cumberland argues that the mature development (“perfection”) of human nature involves individual human will and action for the common good. [109] For Cumberland, human interdependence excludes the natural Hobbes right of each individual to wage war on all others in order to survive personally. Haakonssen, however, cautions against reading Cumberland as a defender of “enlightened self-interest.” On the contrary, the “righteous moral love of mankind” is “a selfless love of God through the love of humanity in ourselves and in others.” [110] Cumberland concludes that actions that are “principally conducive to our happiness” are those that promote “the honor and glory of God” and “charity and justice toward men.” [111] Cumberland notes that the desire for the well-being of our fellow human beings is essential to the “pursuit of our own happiness.” [112] He cites “reason” as the authority to conclude that happiness consists in “the fullest benevolence,” but he also mentions as “essential components of happiness” “benevolent affections,” that is, “love and benevolence toward others” and “that joy that comes from their happiness.” [113] En estos principios la fuerza de la consecuencia no es evidente, sino muy probable. Only wise and wise people attain the knowledge of these truths as “something natural.” With regard to the homicide to which I referred, the rule that defines the specific content of this type of act is the tertiary commandment: it is always unfair to kill an innocent person directly (in general, no one could define precisely and effortlessly the correct content of the prohibition to kill; people know not to kill, But he doesn`t know that an innocent person shouldn`t be killed on purpose.) Thomas Aquinas says that the basic principle of natural law is that good is to be done and evil avoided (ST IaIIae 94:2). It is, one might say, a principle of the comprehensibility of action (cf. Grisez 1965): only actions that can be understood as compatible with this principle, as they are carried out under the idea that good must be sought and evil avoided, can be understood as an intelligible action.
But no one can simply pursue good when trading – you have to pursue a certain good. And Thomas Aquinas is of the opinion that we know immediately by inclination that there are a variety of things that are considered good and therefore must be pursued – life, reproduction, knowledge, society, and rational behavior (ST IaIIae 94:2; 94:3) are all mentioned by Thomas Aquinas (although it is not clear whether the points mentioned are intended to be an exhaustive list). Finnis` theory as a theory of law is certainly more plausible than the traditional interpretation of classical naturalism, but such plausibility comes at the expense of naturalism`s identity as a distinct legal theory. In fact, Finnis` theory of natural law seems compatible with the historical opponent of naturalism, legal positivism, insofar as Finnis` view is compatible with a source-based theory of legal validity; Laws that are technically valid but unfair because of the source do not fully bind the citizen, according to Finnis. In fact, Finnis (1996) believes that the classical naturalism of Thomas Aquinas fully confirms the notion that human laws are “postulated”. George, Robert P., Entre el derecho y la moral, Navarre, Aranzadi-Thomson, 2009, p. 81. Similarly, to solve the problems of regulation and air distribution, the solution proposed by the Chilean legislator does not have to be the same as that outlined by the Canadian authority, not because of the whims of the legislators of each country, but because the factual and material circumstances are different. “Y las soluciones de ayer en ambas ciudades no tienen por qué ser similares a las de hoy, porque entre ayer y hoy hay [important] diferencias de circunstancias”. Ibáñez Santa-María, Gonzalo, “Ética y derecho natural”, en Ayuso, Miguel (ed.), Cuestiones fundamentales de derecho natural, Madrid-Barcelona-Buenos Aires, Marcial Pons, 2009, p.
95. Early Irish law, An Senchus Mor (The Great Tradition), mentions natural law in a number of places. It is a concept that precedes European legal theory and reflects a type of universal law that can be determined by reason and observation of natural action. Neil McLeod identifies concepts with which the law must agree: for (truth) and dliged (right or claim). Both terms are common, although Irish law never defines them strictly. Similarly, the term córus (law according to the correct order) appears in some places and even in the titles of some texts. These were two very real concepts for lawyers, and the value of a particular judgment against them was apparently verifiable. McLeod also suggested that most of the specific laws mentioned have stood the test of time and have therefore been confirmed to be true, while other provisions are justified in other ways because they are younger and have not been tested over time. [58] The laws were written in the oldest dialect of the Irish language.
Berla Féini [Bairla-faina], which was so difficult even at that time that the people who were to become Brehons had to be specially instructed there, the time between the beginning and the apprenticeship of a learned Brehon was usually 20 years. Although, according to the law, one in three people could fulfill the duty if both parties agreed, and both were in good health. [59] It was incorporated into an ethno-Celtic renegade subculture because it has religious overtones and freedom of religious expression allows it to be used again as a valid system in Western Europe. [60] Ronald Dworkin`s so-called third legal theory is best understood as a response to legal positivism, which is essentially composed of three theoretical obligations: the social fact thesis, the conventionality thesis, and the separability thesis.